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GERMANY'S EXPENDITURE FOR WAR
Particularly during the years of war preparation, the Nazi govern.
tneflt was very anxious to conceal its expenditure for military pur-
poses. After 1932neither the exact amount nor the distribution of
public expenditures is reliably known since many essential statistics
on publicfinance were suppressed. They can be estimated only on
the basis of the total revenue received by the German government
from the various sources discussed earlier.'58
An estimate of the revenues of the Nazi government is in itself a
difficult task, except for the income through taxation for which
figures were regularly published. As for the amounts obtained
through loans and miscellaneous sources, we possess only incomplete
and inadequate information. The increase in the Reich indebted-
ness is known onlyfor those amounts which the government ofli-
daily borrowed and publicly admitted. But it has never denied
that it borrowed additional sums at all times in using themanifold,
ingenious devices and techniques already discussed. There is no
doubt that these amounts were very considerable, but no satisfactory
estimate is possible. Since the German government used so many
different devices and changed its borrowing techniques sofre-
quently, it succeeded in keeping that part of the publicdebt tin-
known and beyond conjecture.
Very great difficulties are also encountered insecuring reliable
figures about the financial help which the Nazi government wasable
to obtain from privateand quasi-public organizations. Statistics
were published only on someof the funds that the government re-
ceived from these sources. The figuresincluded in our estimate of
total government revenue are based on verycareful examination.
158 The estimate of total public revenue (Appendix Table 7)has deliberately been
limited to the period 1933-40. Not only are theavailable data for the later years
exceedingly scanty, but the problems of makingreasonable estimates multiply par-
ticularly because of the existence of occupiedterntories in which new currencies were
introduced and which were forced to "contribute"unknown amounts to the Reich
Treasury and to assume other obligations.According to the Bank for International
Settlements (Twelfth Annual Report, p. 120) thetotal amount received by the Reich
Treasury through aflthese impests (including those fromthe 'Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia") was estimated at10 billion reichsmarks in the fiscal year
1940-41. The British Ministry of EconomicWarfare has estimated that from the
beginning of the war until September 30. 1943.Germany has extracted a total amount
of almost 45 billion reichamarks from allthe occupied territories (New YorkTimes,
October 29, 1945).
75I
CHART 4 TOTALTAX AND CUSTOMS RECEIPTSOF REICH, STATE AND
















10-We should againemphasize that such estimates must be used with
even morethan customary care since the Nazis, no doubt delib-
erately, created a great dealof confusion between public and private
functions. While public expenditures weresometimes clearly made
through quasi-public or private bodies, privatefunctions, on the
other hand, were sometimestaken over by public or quasi-public
agencies. We were, therefore, veryconservative in our estimates;
the amounts which the governmentobtained were in all probability
considerably higher than we assumed. But wedo not feel that the
actual amount matters so much aslong as we are able to give the
reader an idea of the magnitudeof the Nazi financial effort.
REVENUE FROM TAXATION
Total tax and customs receiptsof the Reich, state and local govern-
ments more thandoubled from 1932-33 to 1938-39(Appendix Table
). The increasefor the Reich was much largerthan for the state
and local authorities.This was due not only to relativelygreater
changes in the tax systemof the Reich than in that ofthe state and
local authorities, but also tothe redistribution of taxreceipts in
favor of the Reich. Reich taxand customs receiptsamounted to 6.7
billion reichsmarks in iga-,.7billion in 1935-36, and 17.7
billion in I938-39.'while state and local tax revenuesamounted to
billion reichsmarks in 1932-33,.7billion in 1935-36, and 4.6
billion in l9383g.16OInformation on tax receipts by stateand local
authorities is not available forlater years. The Reich aloneincreased
159 In addition to these revenues, theReich received from 1933-34 to1938-39 over
2 billion reicbsmarks fromcertain taxes the proceeds ofwhich were not recorded in
the official reports of tax and customsreceipts. These taxes were:(a) Tax on
Devaluation Gains (December 23,1936) which took away 75 percentof the gains
accruing to private German debtorsfrom the devaluation offoreign currencies. The
total proceeds of this tax wereestimated at 1 billion reichsmarkS.(b) Assessment on
Jewish Property (November 12,1938). This assessment was toraise 1 billion reichs-
marks by successive instalments.Roughly 400 millionreichniarkS were raised in two
imtalments by April1.1939. (c) The SpecialAssessment OflIndustrial Property
(Aufbringungsumlage). The 400 millionreichsmarks received from this taxfrom
1933-34 to 1936-37 did not passthrough the Reich Treasury,but went into the hands
of the Bank for GermanIndustrial Debentures to beused for granting credits to
agriculture in the eastern provinces.(d) The Marriage AidTax (June 1, 1933) which
was levied on wages andassessed income toprovide funds to subsidizemarriages.
Total proceeds from this source,1933-34 t1936-37. amounted to 243.2million
reichimarks. (Stattstikdes DeuLsChe?I ReiChs,Vol.528, 1938. II, pp. 11, 41.)
160 See Appendix Tables 4 and 7.
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'-pits revenue fromtaxes and customs from 17.7 billionreichsrnarks
in 1938.39 to 23.6 billion in I9394o,161to 27.2 billion in 1940-41,
32.5 billion in igi.a andbillion in I94243.162
During the first fiveyears of the Nazi regime, Reich,state and local tax andCustoms receipts maintaineda fairly stable percentage
of national income,amounting to about 23percent (Chart 4). This
rose very swiftly only in the lastfiscal year before thewar - as a
result of new taxes, higherrates, more efficient tax administration,
etc. Because of a swiftly increasingnational income, thegovernment was able for a number ofyears to extract large payments fromthe
people without materially increasingthe percentage of the national
income absorbed bytaxes. Compared, however, withthe last "nor-
mal" fiscal year before thedepression, 1928-29, the increasein the
percentage of national income goinginto taxes was considerable.
In that year,a much smaller percentage of nationalincome, about
one-fifth, was paid intaxes to the government, whilejust before the outbreak of war almostthree-tenths of the naonalincome was shifted to the Treasurythrough taxation. The'..data showingan in. crease in the total tax burden donot offer dfly indicationregarding possible changes in thedistribution or the burden.Only a very
detailed examination ofthe income of specificgroups of the popu-
lation and of their taxpayments at various times wouldthrow light
on possible modifications in theirrespective tax load. Suchan analysis, however, isnot feasible.
REVENUE THROUGHPRIVATE AND
QUASI-PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS
If the financial helpwhich the Nazigovernment obtained through
private and quasi-publicorganizations is taken intoaccount, it will be shown that tiletotal burden upon thepopulation was much heavier than the figureson taxation suggest. Chart5 gives estimates of the most importantcontributions discussed ingreater detail in the previous section.For the period1933-39 they amountedto roughly 151/2 billionreichsmarks. This isequivalent to about i6 percent of total Germantax and customs receipts forthe period. The total estimate isunquestionably a minimumfigure, as indi- vidual estimateswere minima and as this studydoes not include all
161 Wirtsc/zaft und Stntistjk(1940) pp 284. 494.















CHART 5ESTIMATESoFREICH REVENUE COLLECTED THROUGH PRIVATE




























---------contributions. Since the outbreak ofwar even less informatjo,i has
become available oncontributions. There are indicationsthat at the Outset somerevenues declined temporarily, butSteps were no
doubt taken to restore themto their former leveL'°If the few
references found are indicativeof the general trend, the1938.39
estimate is probablya minimum figure for etch of thesubsequent years.
REVENUE FROM BORROWING
Using the manifold methodsof borrowing described ina previous section, the Nazigovernment built up a heavy debt inthe ten
years of its administration It isimpossible, however, to givea Com-
prehensive picture of thetotal debt accumulated byGermany dur- ing this period. Theonly complete figuresavailable are those of the
"declared" debt, i.e., tileofficially admitted debt,which may very well have been distortedby the Nazis, Thesefigures are given in
Appendix Table 6 wherewe have also shown theyear-to-year de- velopment. The table refersto the Reich only; the picturewould not change materially ifstate and localgovernments were included. As war preparationsgained momentum, the debtof the government
grew more and more. (See Chart6.) This would becomefar more evident if we could includethe "undeclared" debt,those many bil- lions of reichsmarksthat the Nazigovernment borrowed in apply. ing the ingenioustechniques and devicesdiscussed before. The Nazis started to borrowclandestinely immediatelyupon coming to power, and they have continueddoing so rightup to the present.'°4
In the first fiveyears of Nazi rule, the officialReich debt increased slowly by comparisonwith later developments.In the subsequent
two fiscal years (of which thelast seven months,however, werewar months) the admitted Reichdebt more thantrebled. It would appear from these figitres thattile short-term debt didnot really start increasing before 1938-39and that it wasnot until the year 1942-43 that the short-termfloating debt finallyexceeded the con- solidated long-term debt.Since we mustassume that the undeclared debt was mostly ofa short-term nature, thispicture is highly mis-













































leading andconceals the fact that Germany,ever since the begin. ning of herwar preparations, has increasedher short-term indebted-
ness considerably. This, ofcourse, became even morepronounced as the war progressed. Thecreation of newmoney instruments for occupied territories, forcedloans by central banksof those terri- tories, commutationof taxes into so-calledcapital payments,com- pulsory andsemi-compulsory deposits byentrepreneurs and wage earners with thegovernment, and various otherdevices increased the financing of thewar through short-terminstruments muchmore than the officialfigures admit.
But even accordingto the official statisticsthe increase in the floating debtwas in 1942-43 almost twiceas large as the rise in long- term loans. By March'943, the officially admitted debtof the Reich had reached thelarge amount of200 billion reiclismarks,or about i6 times as muchas a decade before. Althoughthe significance of the data after1939-40 included in thetable is evenmore limited than Nazi informationabout borroi'ing inpreceding years, the figures at least indicate the trendof the developmentand the tremendous increase in the publicdebt during thewar.
THE COST OF WARPREPARATIONS
The totalamount of revenue inany one fiscal year of theReich, the states and the localauthorities as wellas of the private and quasi- public organizationsis as closean approximation oftotal public expenditure as ispossible under thecircumstances (Chart7). The amounts actually spent bythe Nazigovernment were considerably higher since,as was explained before,no estimate of thesecret debt is included in thefigures on totalrevenue.
The totalrevenue of the Reich,state and localauthorities in- cluding official borrowingand contributionsincreased from14.7 billion reichsmarksin 1933-34 to42 billion reichsmarksin 1938-39 (the last prewaryear) and to 56.5 billionreichsmarks in 1939.40.165 Government income inGermany increasedfrom yearto year during the Nazi regime;the increase, however,was not very large inthe first few years. Itjumped by50 percent in the lastfiscal year before
'65AOIJing to Tough estimateswhich evidentlycannot take the territonalchanges through occupation intoaccount, total governmentrevenue may be assumedto have risen to about 80 billionin 1940.41 andaround IOO huh00each in941-42 and 1942.43.
8tESTIMATED TcYrAi..REVENUE OF REIcH, STATE AND LOCALCHART 7
GOVERNMENTS, FISCAL YEARS ENDING MARCH 31, 1934-40
















1934$935$9351937 1938 $9391940the outbreak ofwar, and by about a third in the next fiscal year.6
These figures might be misleadingif the simultaneous increase in
national incomewere not taken into account. A comparison between
total public revenue and nationalincome reveals that as earlyas in
1933-34, the first year of Hitler's dictatorship,almost a third of
national income was divertedto public funds.167 This percentage
increased rather slowly. A bigjump occurred again only from1937-
38 to 1938.39 when thepercentage of national income channeled
through government handsrose from 40 to 53 percent. Since the
large amounts borrowedsecretly are not included inany of these
figures, it is apparent that theshare in the national income thatwas
turned over to thegovernment was actually considerably higher than
shown in Chart 8.
Using revenue estimatesas a measure of expenditure, it would
appear that total annual expenditureof all public bodies in Ger-
many increased by 185 percent ina period of six years, from the first
fiscal year of the Nazigovernment until the last year before theout- break of war. In thenext fiscal year, seven months of whichwere
war months, a further increase by abouta third took place. We have
very little information about the distributionof these expenditures
for various public services.There was a sharp decline inrelief ex-
penditure which explainsto some extent the fact that theincrease
in total expenditure ofall public bodieswas not greater during the
earlier part of the Naziregime when so muchwas spent for war
preparation.
Any further speculationas to the distribution of Reich expendi-
ture during those years would befutile. We shall attempt,however,
to estimate the total expenditureof Germany for thepreparation of
war. At the beginning of thewar, Hitler asserted that Germanyhad spent 90 billion reichsmarks forarmaments. It is difficult to verify
this statement. Because of thetotal character ofwar preparations,
it is impossible to defineand delimit "armamentexpenditure" with any reliability. It is known, forexample, that part of the budget
provisions for the indoctrinationof youth, health andphysical cul-
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Source: Appendix Table 8.
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Lure were employed for mil'itarypurposes. On the other hand,a good deal of theexpendjti,ire in preparing forwar was not made by the Federalgovernment itself, but byvarious other public,quasi. public and privateorganizations.
After the outbreakof war, Hitler-Youthhostels wereconverted into militaryencampments, 'Strength.Through.Joyboats into hos. pital ships. Whenexpenditures for these itemswere made, they were not listed in thepublic budgetas war expenditures even though their ultimateuse was for militarypurposes. There are other such examples. Some of theAerial Defensepreparations, for instance, were made at theexpense of private plant andhome owners. No one can say withany certainty wherearmament expenditures began or ended. All wecan attempt to do ismake anestimateof the ex- penditures made byReich, State and localgovernments in promoting armaments. In doingso, all expendittires ofthe German nationfor rar preparation thatdid notrun through public budgetswill of necessity be neglected.The only methodwe can adopt requires the use of our previousestimate of total incomeof the three public governmen, in which,however, theamounts unofficially borrowed are not included. Fromthat we deductthe sums whichseem clearly to have beenspent for civilpurposes. It seemsreasonable to assume that theremainder wasspent for warpreparation (Chart 9). The totalexpendjtt,res of the Reichin 1933-4amounted to 5,569.9 millionreichsn,arks Deducting763.7 millionreichsmarks for Army and Navycost and 155.8 millionreichsmarks forrepara. Lions, we find thatcivil expendituresin I93-34amounted to 4,650.4 million reiLhsmarks 168While similarstatistics are availablefor '934-35, the development ofReich civilexpenditures for all subse. quent years can only beestimated.169 Figureson civil expenditures
'6SStajjsljsches Jahrbuch JOrdos Deutsche Reich(1935) pp. 42425. 189 In makingan estimate of Reich civilexpenditure from1935-36on, the following mug be considered' (a)After1934-35the Reich was relievefiof a considerablepart of unemploymentrelief, of pensionsto the war widows,war orphans and war disabled, and of so-calleddomestic worldwar costs; (b) Additionalburdens were incurred because of the increasein population, therise in prices (salaryand wage payments. however, remainedunchanged) and the takingover by the Reich ofthe Justice (1935)and Police(1937)Adminjstrjons fromthe states. To whatextent these increases and declinesoffset each other, it isdifficult to say. Butwe must probably assume an increase of 300million rcichsmarkson account of new ReichPolice and Justice Administrationsand an annual increaseof500million reichsmarin civil expenditures beginning withthe1936-37IIscal year whenunemployment was at a minimum.
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of state and local authoritieswere published through1936-37and
can be estimated for the subsequent years.
According to these estimates, Germanyappears to have spent
about 75 billion reichsmarks forwar preparations prior to the out-
break of war. This figure is smallerthan the amount given by Hitler.
The nature of our estimates, particularlythe omission of the secret
debt which, according to allaccounts, was very considerable, would
account for the difference between our estimate and Hitler'sfigure.
Our estimate seems tosuggest, however, that Hitler's figure was not
basically exaggerated. In fact, ifwe include the expenditures of
private individuals and firms forsubstitute production, stock
accumulation, air defense, etc., the figuremay even be too low.
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We may now recapitulate Germany'sfinancial developments be-
fore and during thewar as follows: The first step, taken early after
the ascension topower of the Nazis, was to strengthen the foreign
exchange control system establishedduring the crisis of1931 in
order to insulate further thefinancial system against international
financial influences. The secondstep was to modify central banking
legislation with the objectof establishing completegovernment
domination over the Reichsbank inorder to use it for the politico-
military objectives of the regime.The third step brought about
changes in the system ofcommercial banking in orderto integrate
tightly control over its creditactivities and toassure the availability
of its facilities for financing thepreparations for, and the conduct of,
war. The fourth major step was the controlover investment through
the capital market in orderto canalize its resources almostexclu-
sively into governmentobligations.
Germany enjoyed acomprehensive and flexible taxsystem before
the Nazis came topower. Since it yielded increasinglylarger rev-
enues automatically with the improvementof business conditions,
little change wasnecessary when the financial needsof the govern-
ment increased with expandingwar preparations. The few changes
that were made consisted ofmoderate increases in existingtaxes and
of several innovations forspecial purposes. Taxincome was sup-
plemented by utilization of therevenues of various private and
quasi-public organizations forpublic purposes.











Nazis resorted, at first, toindirect short-term bOrrOWing. Various
devices were employed toobtain funds through the central and
commercial banking system without the necessity of admittingthe
amountsborrowed. But it was not long before the government
started to raise funds throughthe issuance of formal obligations.
This was accomplishedby selling long-term loans at uniform rates
to thepublic and, to an increasing degree, to savings banksand
insurance institutions,and by selling short-term obligations to the
commercial banking system and theReichsbank.
Wartime borrowing has consistedchiefly of short- and long-term
issues placed directlywith the banks and savings institutions but not
with the publics a processcalled "silent borrowing." For the first
three and a half yearsof the war, the official Reich debt, abouthalf
of which is short-term,has risen sixfold. In addition, thereexists
an unofficialshort-term debt the size of which is notknown.
During the period of warpreparations total government receipts
rose slightlyin relation to national income,from three-tenths to
two-fifths; the amount rose, however,in the last year before the war
to over o percentof national income. Total governmentrevenues
compared to national income havecertainly been even higher than
50 percentduring the war period itself,although even approximate
estimates are not possible.This is particularly true sinceGermany
has shifted as muchof the cost of conquest apossible onto occu-
pied territories; data on these"revenues" are very incomplete.The
total cost to the Germanpeople of preparing for warranged from
an estimated 'to go billionreichsmarks, but the cost of waging
war has, even sofar, been several timesthis amount.
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